Friday, 20 June 2008
Findan
Thursday, 19 June 2008
Stones and the women
Wednesday, 18 June 2008
Death steals in
Seals, they are always there, bobbing in the water, in the surge of small waves, or basking on the shore from which they roll and shuffle when they see us come, but we have a strange affinity, we and the seals, have reason to observe each other: we meet on the foreshore or in the shallows, in and out of each other's element, but only ever in the shallows or on the foreshore. In our element they are ungainly and vulnerable, in theirs so are we. And we merely observe each other, the seals at their edge, regarding us at ours as thus our two worlds touch and shift with the swirl and movement of water over sand and rock. We cannot survive long in their world, nor they in ours, and so we observe each other and, when we think we are unobserved, we creep into or out of the water, to test and bask and rest and float, another world, with struggles and ecstasies we know nothing of, the limits and otherness of death.
Tuesday, 17 June 2008
Be quiet, I'm thinking
I picked up my old school copy of Thomas Mann's Tonio Kroeger in translation and started to read one of the other stories in it, Tristan. Slightly chilling to realise that these two were published in 1902 and 1903 respectively, and that Death in Venice was published in 1912, all before the Great War. My Irish grandmother would have been a schoolgirl in Ballybricken and her brother Paddy would not have known of course that he was to die quite soon. There was also a cousin Paddy, who fell from a railway bridge and died aged 14, and my mother had superstitious feelings about the name, otherwise my brother would have been christened Patrick. As it is she still calls him Paddy. Anyway, where is this all going. I saw a documentary about VW, Vaughan Williams, and the voice-over recalled that his first wife never quite recovered from the death of her brother in WWI. A similar event caused my grandmother to leave Ireland:
Oh yes, I turned and looked back towards the train,
leaning at Heuston against a pillar,
and wept for your young, slight, long-coated ghost:
'well, Katie Grant, ma’am, so you’re twenty four ...'
the same age as my eldest daughter now,
unable to live in the small cramped house
crowded with sisters, parents and your grief
you left Ireland, wept as the steam train screamed
as it tore apart wildly clutching hands
and fled from Paddy’s death to Liverpool.
Did Mary sadly take you in her arms
for comfort, or did you stand there, stiffly
forbidden to grieve, unless by cold nods
and absences, of mind and in your words?
Was that the task you set me when you died
and I lay in bed terrified you’d come
to break back into my protected world:
to recall the source of your stern-set jaw
lament your bitter, unhealed wound of war?
Tonio Kroeger was an important text for me, reading it in German in the VIth form, the only pupil, sitting with Laz over his exiguous fire. It seemed to give a sense to my adolesccent alienation, to see that my sensibility was after all acceptable in its unacceptability, that there were others ... But, reading Tristan now, I only mention it because it is has a nice image of how we seek to swindle conscience: but it gnaws away at us till we are simply one wound. Well, a touch of the vapours there, but I liked the use of 'swindle'. ...
Monday, 16 June 2008
Walking towards Leaper's Geo
Thursday, 12 June 2008
A footprint in the sand
I was bemused a while ago to receive an email from Big Jim in which he described the great Scottish Philosopher as 'that clown Hume', bemused because he is after all the great Scottish philosopher.
But I have been thinking about his empiricism recently and recalling what I had long ago forgotten, that the distinction between impressions and ideas upon which everything in Hume rests, rests in fact upon a metaphor which, if we take it seriously, undermines everything he says. One always forgets things in philosophy, partly because one is carried along by the flow of philosophical writing in which authors settle too readily on a premise and then race to a conclusion. Everything depends for Hume on tracing 'ideas' back to the 'impressions' of which they are faint copies (in fact these ideas or images are better candidates for 'impressions' than the alleged impressions themselves) and Hume's sceptical rejection of our ideas of necessity, causality, the spatio-temporal continuity of bodies, the permanence of the self or soul, relies on obvious features of what he calls impressions as they impress themselves, as it were, upon our minds. Such impressions last as long as they are perceived, they do not hang around unperceived, so what grounds do we have for talking about the same body when all we are aware of is a qualitatively identical impression, etc.
Which takes us back to the footprint in the sand. Now that is an impression, an impression of a foot, just as a crater is an impression of a meteor or a child's handprint on a piece of paper an impression of their hand, etc. The footprint gives us some idea of the size and shape of a particular foot. It doesn't look like a foot, but it shows us the outline and the indentation tells us something about the weight of the body relative to the softness of the ground. But impressions of this kind belong within our epistemological economy and are not its basis. We can reason from footprint to foot because we know about footprints and about feet, and we know what an impression is and why and how it is made. The idea of an impression is the idea of an impression of something that is known independently. In that case Hume's impressions are not impressions, he has no title to that word. We don't see impressions of bodies, we see bodies, we see things, stones, for instance, on a raised beach. The Humean trick lies in persuading us that what we really see is only ... This is not an argument against scepticism about empirical knowledge, it is just an argument against Hume. It doesn't deliver us back a permanent self, either, for that there is no such thing is not to be argued for in terms of Hume's failure to find a self.
The whole discussion of empirical knowledge is vitiated, it seems to me, by a failure to take seriously the grammatical or conceptual difference between talk of objects which are essentially mind-dependent, and things, which are not. Philosophers are always talking about objects as though they were talking about things and things as though they were objects, and they get the grammars tangled.
Now how can I say this in a semi-public space without sounding mad: when I say that we see things and not merely impressions of things, I am not asserting in Johnsonian spirit that we see things, I am saying that it is a mistake, conceptually, to claim that we see impressions of things. What we see are things and if we are to raise sceptical questions, as we should, in a spirit of epistemological vigilance, then we must address the issues in those terms, and not in terms of impressions, which is a bad place to start from.
Tuesday, 10 June 2008
small teething issues
But, hey, it's June, and the grass is green and the fields are yellow with buttercups, and the sky is blue, though the wind be strong and the clouds on the horizon heavy, and I need a walk, and a mile or so is no great thing, though in the end I got a lift from a satirical builder friend who was forced to attend later after I realised that despite the reassuring sound of the pump the radiators were not getting warmer nor the water hot. I had misread the oil levels, there were no oil levels, the cupboard was bare, the tank empty, the next boat on Friday, and 900 litres will cost more than £600. A helpful fifty litres were not enough to force an oil flow along the almost level gradient, so I starve until Friday or, more accurately, go without hot baths. Now is there an immersion heater that no one told me about, pray? But everything is so green here, so sharp the change from early April, and there is so much good will here ...